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The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes , by C. P. Ragland. Ox-
ford University Press, 2016. Pp. 272. $78.00 (hardcover).
EMILY KELAHAN, Illinois Wesleyan University
C. P. Ragland’s The Will to Reason is a nuanced and novel discussion of 
two central issues in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy: the scope 
and nature of the skeptical doubts of the First Meditation and the nature 
of human freedom in light of Descartes’ Fourth Meditation theodicy. 
Ragland deftly engages rival interpretations of a variety of Cartesian doc-
trines, registering agreement and disagreement with precision. Overall, 
his conclusions are carefully defended and richly supported by text. De-
spite the title, Descartes’ skeptical problems and his view of the nature of 
human freedom sometimes seem only tenuously connected. However, by 
the end, Ragland does connect the dots for his readers and enables them 
to see why he believes these things are importantly related.
Chapter 1 is an analysis of the scope and nature of the skeptical worries 
raised in the First Meditation. Descartes’ skepticism is often described as 
methodological. He raises doubts about the reliability of both the senses 
and reason in order to show that reason is superior to sensation and, when 
used properly, yields reliable beliefs. In fact, many scholars believe this is 
the project of the Meditations, establishing the authority of reason over the 
senses and against skepticism. Ragland agrees with this big-picture view, 
but stakes out less familiar ground on the type of skeptical worry with 
which Descartes is concerned and how best to handle the Cartesian Circle. 
He believes Descartes is primarily concerned with “consequent,” not 
“antecedent,” skepticism, afflicting those who initially trust reason only 
to discover that it is self-undermining in exactly the way highlighted by 
the Cartesian Circle. Descartes needs God as a guarantor of his clear and 
distinct perceptions, but reason suggests that he might have a defective 
nature such that he errs systematically. This doubt is universal, applying 
even to the truth rule and clear and distinct perceptions, and, in the case 
of clear and distinct perceptions, indirect. Descartes cannot doubt clear 
and distinct perceptions when he’s having them, but only retrospectively. 
However, this retrospective doubt is what Descartes needs to remove with 
the guarantee afforded by the existence of an omniperfect God.
Following some other interpreters, Ragland endorses a version of the 
“two-level” solution to the Cartesian Circle wherein there are two types 
of knowledge Descartes has at different crucial moments. He has cogni-
tio, a lower level of knowledge of current clear and distinct perceptions, 
when he begins to trace the circle, but he acquires scientia once he proves 
God’s existence and the truth rule. This allows him to be certain of clear 




and distinct perceptions he’s had in the past even when he’s not perceiv-
ing them. Included in this stock is his perception of an omniperfect God, 
which precludes the possibility of a deceptive nature. I’m not convinced 
that this solves Descartes’ circularity problem, but I see that the payoff is 
sizeable and credit Ragland for engaging deeply with several objections.
Illuminatingly, chapter 2 casts Descartes’ Fourth Meditation theodicy as 
epistemological as much as theological. Far from an unnecessary interlude 
in the Meditations, Ragland argues that Descartes’ theodicy is crucial to his 
overall project of establishing the reliability of reason against skepticism. 
God is the guarantor of his clear and distinct perceptions, but the fact that 
he errs counts as rational evidence against the existence of an omniperfect 
God. Thus, Descartes must show that error does not entail that an omniper-
fect God does not exist. To do this, Ragland argues that Descartes actually 
responds to two different questions using two different strategies. First, 
how is actual error compatible with God’s perfection? Ragland is satisfied 
with the traditional free will defense as an answer. Secondly, why would 
an omnipotent, perfectly benevolent God give humans freedom given that 
it makes error possible? Ragland accepts the traditional answer here, too. 
God has a morally sufficient reason for giving us the kind of freedom that 
makes error possible, namely, that the universe is more perfect with hu-
mans possessing the kind of freedom that leads to error than it would be 
if we did not. Distinguishing these questions is helpful, but invoking the 
the principle of organic unities is fairly tried and true. However, Ragland’s 
engagement with Michael Della Rocca on the related question of why God 
would allow errors with respect to the senses but not with respect to clear 
and distinct perceptions reminds one of why both of these philosophers are 
so very worth reading. Ragland resolves the mystery posed by Descartes’ 
differential treatment of sense-based beliefs and clear and distinct percep-
tions by arguing that Descartes endorses a version of Kant’s “ought implies 
can” principle. It’s not that Descartes assumes the truth of his clear and 
distinct perceptions before the end of the Fourth Meditation, but rather 
that he does not believe that God requires us to do what we cannot do, 
namely, resist assent to clear and distinct perceptions. We can, however, 
resist assent to obscure and confused perceptions, and should. One might 
wonder whether this is a genuine normative principle capable of saving 
reason from inconsistency. Ragland guards against this worry somewhat 
by connecting it to a principle that is uncontroversially normative, “avoid 
error,” but I worry that this move doesn’t have quite enough horsepower. 
Despite my reservations, I will never teach or think about the Fourth Medi-
tation in quite the same way having read this chapter.
Convinced that Descartes has shown that human error and the divine 
guarantee are compossible and also that Descartes has a way of defending 
reason against charges of inconsistency, chapters 3 and 4 seek to further 
elucidate the murky notion of freedom that generated so much trouble 
in the Fourth Meditation. Ragland argues that, to the surprise of many, 
Descartes consistently endorses a version of the Principle of Alternative 
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Possibilities (PAP), or the view that freedom requires being able to do oth-
erwise than we actually do. To begin, Ragland stakes his position on how 
best to understand Descartes’ puzzling, and only, definition of freedom:
[i] the will, or freedom of choice . . . simply consists in this: that we are able 
to do or not do (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); [ii] or better 
[vel potius], simply in this: that we are carried in such a way toward what 
the intellect proposes for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, 
that we feel ourselves determined [determinari] to it by no external force. (AT 
7:57/CSM 2:40; Ragland’s translation)
This definition is composed of two clauses, and it’s not clear how they 
relate. The first clause says that freedom is a two-way power (to do or not 
do). The second says that freedom is spontaneity (not being determined by 
an external force). Does the second clause replace the first? Does it expand 
on it? Ragland argues that it clarifies it. Two-way power and spontaneity 
are “two sides of the same coin” and “any free act with one must also have 
the other” (86). Ragland pores over the text of the Meditations to support 
this reading of the definition and his claim that Descartes is committed to 
the PAP. The latter is clear only once we acknowledge two different sorts 
of two-way power: power in virtue of not being externally determined 
and power in virtue of being motivationally indifferent. While Descartes 
cannot be motivated otherwise when having a clear and distinct percep-
tion, he could have done otherwise in the sense that he is not externally 
determined to assent to clear and distinct perceptions.
Chapter 4 advances textual support from outside the Meditations for 
Ragland’s claim that Descartes is committed to a weak version of the PAP 
(freedom requires the ability to do otherwise in the sense of not being ex-
ternally determined). Particularly interesting is his discussion of the con-
nection between Giebieuf and Descartes where he argues against Kenny 
and Gilson in favor of the weak PAP view. By the close of the chapter, 
Ragland has made Descartes’ uncomfortable positioning with respect to 
freedom in the Fourth Meditation clear. He is, apparently, mired in an in-
consistent quartet. Because Descartes treats the will and freedom of choice 
as synonyms in his Fourth Meditation definition, he is committed to (1) 
freedom is essential to the will (FEW). He is also, according to Ragland, 
committed to (2) PAP. Together these entail that alternative possibilities 
are essential to the will. Because Descartes believes that we cannot resist 
assenting to clear and distinct perceptions, he is committed to (3) clear and 
distinct determinism (CDD). However, because he believes that assent to 
the cogito is voluntary, he is committed to (4) judgment is a voluntary act 
(JVA). Together CDD and JVA entail that alternative possibilities are not 
essential to the will. As Ragland observes, the conflict is really between 
CDD and PAP, so one must reject Cartesian freedom as incoherent, reject 
CDD, reject PAP, or rethink CDD or PAP such that they no longer conflict. 
Ragland takes the last option with his two senses of two-way power, one 
of which doesn’t deny CDD.
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Throughout chapters 3 and 4 I found myself resisting Ragland’s clever 
two-two-way powers solution to the inconsistent quartet. It’s clear that 
we are not motivationally indifferent when it comes to clear and distinct 
perceptions, and so Ragland must argue that we are not externally deter-
mined. But what counts as “external”? As clear and distinct perceptions 
ultimately come from God, it would seem that we lack freedom in both 
senses of two-way power. Ragland goes to some lengths in addressing 
these kinds of worries in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 advances a compati-
bilist reading of Descartes that hinges on a distinction between categorical 
and hypothetical two-way power (we now have a two-two-two-way-
powers solution). Categorical power is the ability to do otherwise in the 
exact same circumstances. Hypothetical power is “counterfactual categor-
ical ability” to do otherwise in “relevantly different circumstances” (131). 
What differentiates the circumstances is what an agent decides to make 
the object of her attention if she were to trace back time. It is true that 
agents are determined by clear and distinct perceptions once attended to, 
and so lack categorical freedom, but they might have initially directed 
their attention elsewhere, so hypothetically they are free. Intellect does 
determine the will in cases of clear and distinct perceptions, but it doesn’t 
determine the will in all cases, so, in opposition to his previous view, Rag-
land maintains that Descartes is a compatibilist. I remain unconvinced that 
this analysis fully addresses concerns about what’s external to the agent, 
and I suspect that this kind of two-two-two-way freedom may strike some 
as not being freedom at all. Chapter 6 details the ways in which Descartes 
sees freedom as coming in degrees. While interesting, it fills out Cartesian 
freedom as Ragland sees it without doing much to advance his claim that, 
properly understood, freedom helps Descartes refute skepticism. Again, 
freedom helps by being the fall guy for error in the Fourth Meditation, 
which insulates God against the charge that divine nature might be such 
that we cannot reasonably expect human nature to not be defective, allow-
ing us to once again rule out defective nature doubt and to trust reason.
Chapter 7 returns to the connection between freedom and skepticism 
about reason by way of an examination of how to reconcile divine provi-
dence with human freedom, but this time the news isn’t good for Descartes. 
According to Ragland, this is where the Cartesian project really comes off 
the rails. After contextualizing Descartes’ views on a variety of intercon-
necting doctrines, Ragland carefully explains that Descartes has a unique 
perspective on providence and freedom that borrows some elements from 
the Dominicans and some from the Jesuits. God creates the eternal truths 
and all “conditional future contingents.” Because of this, God logically de-
termines human action even if God does not causally determine human 
action. As Ragland puts it, “creatures may not be puppets, but they cer-
tainly seem like robots, merely acting out a program that God wrote” (221). 
Reason tells us both that we are free and that God logically determines 
our actions—conflicting propositions—forcing us to question its reliabil-
ity. As an attempt at reconciling this conflict (or perhaps just a surrender), 
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Descartes concedes that we are rationally incapable of fully understanding 
God’s power. Thus, a weakness in our reason is exposed and we cannot be 
sure that God would not give us a defective nature.
Though hard to resist in the moment, one must, of course, question 
whether Ragland’s interpretation of Descartes on human freedom is the 
most accurate account of how Descartes actually conceived of it. If it is, 
one must question whether it can carry the load Ragland thinks it can even 
for the longer but ultimately short distance that it goes. At the very least, 
Ragland shows that the Cartesian project of establishing the authority and 
reliability of reason against skepticism might implode at a later juncture 
than is commonly thought, and this is an important contribution. Insightful 
and compellingly argued, The Will to Reason is a seminal work on Descartes’ 
view of human freedom and his skeptical crisis likely to challenge and de-
light scholars for years to come.
